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11
ROTATING THE AXIS OF
OUR INVESTIGATION
Wittgenstein’s investigations and
Hölderlin’s poetology
Richard Eldridge
I
It is evident that the nature of conceptual consciousness is a central topic of
Philosophical Investigations. The protagonist of the text investigates knowing how to
go on (to follow a rule, to determine the next term in a series) in an effort to
become clearer about how he or anyone is so much as able to think conceptually
at all. Beyond sensory awareness and apt differential responsiveness to our environments, how do we come to predicate concepts of objects and to be aware of
ourselves as doing so? What is it or would it be to do so correctly, with ‘full justification’ before oneself and others – if, indeed, such full justification can
reasonably be pursued?
Notoriously a number of answers to these questions are considered and
rejected. It is neither necessary nor sufficient for applying a concept correctly that
one have an image in mind, that one be simply disposed to apply it in a certain
way, or that one apply it as a mechanism does in fact. The criteria for applying a
concept are connected ‘more tightly’ with correct applications than images, dispositions, or actual mechanical workings are; correct applications are rather
‘internal’ to the content of a concept and to mastery of it. And they are also
connected ‘more loosely,’ in that concepts can change to some extent over time:
criteria and applications can shift together as conceptual practice changes in
certain regions. The only thing, it seems, that can be said to summarize and elucidate the application of concepts is that “‘obeying a rule’ is a practice.…There is a
way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what
we call ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases” (§§202, 201).1
Is this more or less negative result the whole story about concept application
and about the interest of the text? There are a number of reasons to think that it
is not. Focusing on this result alone fails to account for why Wittgenstein begins
the text by considering a passage from St. Augustine, with whom, it seems,
Wittgenstein identifies deeply, as a figure in whom a conversion into meaningfulness is accomplished.2 It fails also to account for the presence in the text of
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striking remarks about continuing temptations, difficulties, and anxieties that this
negative result seems not to still. For example, the problems that trouble us are
“deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of language and
their significance is as great as the importance of our language” (§111). We do
“predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it” (§104), as
though we could not help fantasizing about some perfect justification for concept
application that lies in the essence of the object itself, deeper than our practice
seems to ‘happen to be.’ We have trouble paying attention to what we should pay
attention to – the varieties and subtleties of actual usage; instead we find
ourselves feeling clumsy and doing something else. “Here it is difficult to keep
our heads up…; we feel as if we had to repair a torn spider’s web with our
fingers” (§106). We want, or something in us makes us want, the wrong thing, so
that “the axis of our investigation must be rotated, but about the fixed point of
our real need” (§108). These remarks suggest that what is needed is a kind of
turning around of the soul or a conversion of attention and interest that we have
trouble accomplishing fully, so that the text becomes – whatever its teaching or
doctrine about concept application – also a narrative or parable of the disquietudes of the human. Above all, focusing on the negative result about concept
application fails to account for the structure of the text as an internal dialogue.
As we read, it becomes clear, as Cavell puts it, “that each of the voices, and
silences, of the Investigations are the philosopher’s, call him Wittgenstein, and they
are meant as ours.”3
In order to account for these things – Wittgenstein’s interest in Augustine, the
remarks about temptation and difficulty, and above all the structure of the text as
internal dialogue or self-interrogation – it is natural then to take the text as an
essentially dramatic record in which successive temptations and overcomings of
them, without clear end, are foregrounded over the achievement of definite
results. Philosophical Investigations then seems to be not a body of doctrine so much
as a continuous ‘working through’ of the plights of the self in the service of what
Wittgenstein in the Big Typescript calls “the transparency of arguments. Justice.”4
Cavell takes the text this way in noting what he describes as “a struggle with the
contrary depths of oneself ”5 in it. I have similarly focused on the text of
Philosophical Investigations as a dramatic display and acknowledgment of fundamental conditions of human life, according to which “our powers of arbitrary
choice…must be accepted…as being open to continuous re-information
by…norms of rational willing and expression, against and within changing
cultural backgrounds.”6
But now the worry arises that such a working through and dramatic display
could not be philosophically significant. No theses seem to be quite established.
Arguments appear at best as moves within an ongoing self-interrogation, not as
routes to definite results. It seems too ‘optional’ whether anyone responds to the
protagonist’s worries and to the drama of the text. Is philosophy here, within
this reading, being vaporized into bad literature, as some of my colleagues
sometimes ask?
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There is no immediate and conclusive reply to these worries about the fate of
philosophy once we focus on dramas of self-interrogation. Wittgenstein himself
evidently felt worries like these in the course of his investigations, as he wondered,
“Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to
destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all
the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble)” (§118). If the answer
to this question is that nothing is destroyed but “houses of cards [Luftgebäude: buildings in the air],” then that answer itself seems to fail to return us to what we might
have hoped for from philosophy: say, a characterization of the mind and its place
in nature, or an account of exactly what it is to apply concepts and to be governed
by (nothing more – and nothing less – than our) criteria of correctness in doing so.
Perhaps, then, it will help to address worries about the fate of philosophy
(even if not quite to allay them) to compare Wittgenstein’s sense of being a
person – possessed of judgmental power one knows not how – with a similar
sense of the human person that emerges in Friedrich Hölderlin’s response to the
transcendental philosophies of Kant and Fichte. Hölderlin’s philosophical and
poetic career begins with his engagement with the Kantian–Fichtean project of
establishing the logically necessary conditions of distinctively human judgmental
awareness and apperceptively unified consciousness. Like Fichte, Hölderlin
hopes initially to revise and ‘complete’ Kant’s transcendental deduction of the
objective validity of the categories, in order to show both how we can be at
home in nature in knowing it and how we can live freely – both as independent
shapers of our lives and in harmony with nature and one another. Unlike Fichte,
Hölderlin soon comes to despair of carrying out this showing on the basis of
anything like an argument or a philosophical theory. But instead of either simply
stopping philosophy or abandoning hopes to live in self-conscious freedom and
in attunement with nature and other beings, Hölderlin develops a poetology, an
account of the kind of responsiveness to subject matter that should figure in a
successful poem that will trace possibilities of life from within human life rather
than from a master theoretical standpoint outside it. The central idea of
Hölderlin’s poetology is that the successful poem will embody transitions or modulations among experiences and moods of independence and attunement, thereby
showing that these experiences and moods can be coherently integrated with one
another within a life. Against this background Wittgenstein can be seen to offer
in his own itinerary similar transitions or modulations between independence
and attunement and so likewise to offer us, through identification with his voices,
the possibility for us to acknowledge fundamental conditions of human life. But
in order to see this – and to see how and why it might matter – we will need to
have some of the details of Hölderlin’s poetology before us.

II
As is well known, Kant undertakes in the transcendental deduction of the
Critique of Pure Reason to establish that the categories or pure concepts of the
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understanding (especially causality and substance) apply to empirical objects or
objects as we can be aware of them through the use of the senses. It is worth a
moment, however, to consider just how unusual Kant’s argument procedure
actually is. He begins, in a move that defines transcendental philosophy, by investigating the necessary conditions of judgmentally structured experience. My
consciousness [Erfahrung] consists not simply of buzzes, tingles, color patches,
and sounds. It is rather an awareness the content of which can be reported in a
claim or judgment, for example, a conscious taking of a to be F.
How do I do this thing? Where do such judgmental takings of things to be
thus and so ‘come from’? Notoriously, Kant does not offer any empirical or scientific psychological answer to this question. Instead he argues that I can have
judgmental awareness only if my consciousness is apperceptively unified. That is,
I must be implicitly aware (and able if the occasion arises to become explicitly
aware) that all my representations (my concepts and intuitions) are mine.
Without any relation to a continuing apperceptively unified consciousness, mere
quasi-representations (buzzes, tingles, color patches, sounds) would merely ‘float
by’ in awareness, without being combined to form judgments. Quasi-representations would suffice for apt differential response to certain features of an
environment, but not for judgment. Judgments, in contrast, are composed of fullblooded representations, and these representations must be one and all mine.
The manifold representations [for example, of the color, shape, and position
of, say, a cup] that are given in a certain intuition [of the cup] would not
all together be my representations if they did not all together belong to
a single consciousness; i.e. as my representations (even if I am not
[explicitly] conscious of them as such) they must yet necessarily be in
accord with the condition under which alone they can stand together
in a universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would
throughout not belong to me. From this original combination much
may be inferred.7
So genuine representations (concepts and intuitions) can ‘fit together’ (like the
words of a grammatically well-formed sentence that ‘fit together’ in virtue of
being nouns, verbs, determiners, etc.). I do fit them together to form judgments.
This is possible only on the condition that these representations are all mine. But
what, then, is the further condition under which they can ‘stand together’ as one
and all mine? What does Kant mean by their ‘original combination’ in one
consciousness? – Very roughly, and without rehearsing and assessing the entire
argument, Kant claims that my representations (concepts and intuitions) are my
products, things I make. In particular, I use the pure or non-empirical concepts of
the understanding – the categories – to form part of the conceptual content of
any first-order, empirical concept I have. For example, cup is a substance-concept;
breaks is a causative relation. These pure or non-empirical concepts cannot (as
Hume saw) be derived from experience. They are rather presupposed by and put
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to use within all judgmental experience. My having of genuine first-order
concepts and intuitions-of-objects requires the use of the categories within them.
Through concepts so structured and so used, experience (Erfahrung) comes to
have the judgmental structure that it does.
Crucially, the categories or pure concepts that are thus put to use in any (judgmental) experience are themselves synthesized by me, not derived from passive
responsiveness to experience. That we have or form the categories, and so have
genuinely judgmental experience, is, Kant argues, the result of “an act of the
spontaneity of the power of representation [or of] an action of the understanding.”8 Without such acts through which the categories are non-empirically
formed and embedded within first-order concepts as part of their content, there
would not be judgmental experience. Particular judgments then result from
further acts of putting together concepts and intuitions (with their necessary,
implicit categorical substructural content) to form, for example, predications of
the possession of properties by objects.
Kant goes on to argue, notoriously, that although original acts of spontaneity
in the formation of the categories are required for judgmental awareness, in the
end the categories that are thus formed and used must ‘answer to’ real, objective,
mind-independent features of the objects we are able to experience. In his own
formulations of the First and Second Analogies of Experience: “In all change of
appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.…All alterations occur in accordance with the law of cause and
effect.”9 The underlying ideas throughout the argument for these conclusions are
(1) that I would not be able to form judgments, understood as aiming at correct
representation of something external to me (bracketing the question of whether
they in fact hit their targets), if I did not possess the concept of an objective (mindand act-independent) succession of representations; without this concept, I could
not so much as take myself to be forming judgments about objects (whether reliably
or not); and (2) that I can possess the concept of an objective succession of representations only if there are in fact objectively determined (mind- and actindependent) successions of events and arrangements of matter into objectswith-properties in all of the objects external to me that I experience. This
difficult argument is as it may be. The argument for these further conclusions
has, to put it mildly, occasioned considerable discussion.
What is less often noticed, however, is that Kant goes on from this account of
the active role of the subject in the formation of judgmental experience to argue
that we are intelligible beings capable of free action or of action resulting from
“causality through freedom.”
In the case of lifeless nature and nature having merely animal life, we
find no ground for thinking of any faculty which is other than sensibly
conditioned. Yet the human being, who is otherwise acquainted with
the whole of nature solely through sense, knows himself also through
pure apperception, and indeed in actions and inner determinations
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which cannot be accounted at all among the impressions of sense; he
obviously is in one part phenomenon, but in another part, namely in
regard to certain faculties, he is a merely intelligible object, because the
actions of this object [viz. in forming the categories and using them to form judgments, as part of the substructural content of first-order concepts] cannot at all be
ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility. We call these faculties understanding and reason; chiefly the latter is distinguished quite properly
and preeminently from all empirically conditioned powers.…10
Or, as Kant puts it in the Foundations, “in the final analysis there can be but one
and the same reason which must be differentiated only in application [i.e. in theory
and judgment, on the one hand, and in intending and acting, on the other].”11
While we thus ineliminably recognize ourselves as free in both judgment and
action, we can nonetheless not investigate empirically how we are free. “We do
not indeed comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral
imperative; yet we do comprehend its incomprehensibility, which is all that can
fairly be demanded of a philosophy which in its principles strives to reach the
limit of human reason.”12

III
Kant’s immediate successors were not slow to find his conception of the human
subject and its powers of judgment and action both tantalizing and obscure. Kant
promised to establish both that we are entitled to claim knowledge of an order of
empirical nature and that the will is free and bound by moral law, all without
dogmatic reversion to putative knowledge of ultimate reality, God’s will, or principles of being as such. But is this promise clearly fulfilled? Salomon Maimon remarks
in a letter to Kant that he has “made [his] peace with the Critique very nicely” by
“grant[ing] what you propound as at least problematical” and constructing “a
psychological deduction of the categories.”13 Maimon’s reaction is telling. To put
forward a psychological deduction of the categories – a scientific psychological
account of how they are caused to be formed in the mind – is to intimate that
Kant’s own deduction of ‘transcendental–logical’ necessary conditions of experience – of conditions ‘under which alone’ experience is possible – is unsound, or at
least unsatisfying. One wants to know exactly why and how ‘spontaneity’ operates in
us as it does. Failing an explanation of this, Kant’s remarks about what we ‘must’ be
doing in contributing to our judgmental experience seem speculative, at least to
many readers. So too, then, do his remarks about the freedom of the will and our
possession of a power in action of causality through freedom. To grant what Kant
propounds as “at least problematical” seems emptily voluntaristic and seems not to
offer us the account of the human subject in the world that we want.
And so begins the host of efforts to revise and complete Kant’s deduction and
demonstration of the reality of freedom, including Reinhold’s philosophy of
representation, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, and Hegel’s Phenomenology, among many
216

The Literary Wittgenstein, edited by John Gibson, and Wolfgang Huemer, Taylor & Francis Group, 2004. ProQuest Ebook
Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/swarthmore/detail.action?docID=182426.
Created from swarthmore on 2021-11-29 22:39:18.

RO TAT I N G T H E A X I S O F O U R I N V E S T I G AT I O N

others. As Fichte remarks, skepticism (urged by Schulze in his “Aenesidemus
Review” of Reinhold’s system) “has shaken my own system to its foundations,
and, since one cannot very well live under the open sky, I have been forced to
construct a new system.”14 The effort is to explain how constraint from the world
of empirical objects combines with structures of synthesis that are spontaneously
produced within the subject so as to yield judgmental experience – all while
remaining within the strictures of the transcendental standpoint, eschewing
empirical investigations in favor of tracing necessary presuppositions. As Fichte
puts it, “Philosophy…must…furnish the ground of all experience,”15 thereby
grounding Kant’s system in a way that is more than merely problematical.
It may well be that these efforts are misguided. Notoriously Fichte seems to
equivocate on whether he is supplying a causal account of experience or a reason
why experience must have the underlying structures that it has. If the former, then
we seem to need a better empirical psychology than anything Fichte supplies; if the
latter (as Fichte generally intends), then his account of reasons that have to do with
necessities of subject activity seems no better grounded than Kant’s own account.
Kant himself sharply criticized Fichte’s efforts to move beyond his own determination of the (transcendentally) logically necessary conditions of experience. “I hereby
declare,” Kant wrote in his “Open Letter on Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre,”
that I regard Fichte’s Theory of Science [Wissenschaftslehre] as a totally indefensible system. For the pure theory of science is nothing more or less
than mere logic, and the principles of logic cannot lead to any material
knowledge. Since logic, that is to say, pure logic, abstracts from the
content of knowledge, the attempt to cull a real object out of logic is a
vain effort and therefore a thing that no one has ever done. If the transcendental philosophy is correct, such a task would involve metaphysics
rather than logic. But I am so opposed to metaphysics, as defined
according to Fichtean principles, that I have advised him, in a letter, to
turn his fine literary gifts to the problem of applying the Critique of Pure
Reason rather than squander them in cultivating fruitless sophistries.16
Instead, then, of attempting to discern how experience is “determined” by
some impersonal, rational subject activity (Fichte’s stance) or substance
(Schelling and neo-Spinozism) that is “beyond” or “before” the subject, the right
tack is, as J. S. Beck puts it, to “try to get the reader right into this [subject] activity
itself, as it discloses itself originally in…representation.”17 Tracing the ‘rules’ for
subject activity from “within” it, without grounding in the operations of any
substance, may well be the path of prudence and insight in philosophy.18

IV
But what is it to be “right in the activity” of a subject? How can one persist in
this activity well, without guiding assurance about the substantial determination
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and meaning of this activity? How within subject activity can the independence, autonomy, and dignity of self-conscious selfhood be expressed, together
with the maintenance of genuine receptivity toward the world and acceptance
of others in a stance of love and openness? Without independence, selfhood is
compromised; without love and openness, independent selfhood is empty,
nihilistic, and vengefully world-denying. But how can independent selfhood and
loving openness be blended? These are the questions that are foundational for
Hölderlin’s receptions of Kant and Fichte and for his consequent conception of
the human subject.
Hölderlin’s mature career begins with the 1795 essay fragment “Judgment
and Being.” Rejecting any Fichtean effort to show how finite subject activity is
‘determined’ by either absolute Being or impersonal rational subject activity as
such, Hölderlin argues that “judgment is…that separation through which alone
object and subject become possible, the arche-separation.”19 That is to say, a
finite subject as a bearer of judgmental consciousness emerges out of Being.
Before there is finite subjecthood proper, there is the condition in which implicit,
unactualized “subject and object are united altogether and not only in
part;…there and nowhere else can be spoken of Being proper.”20 But this primordial Being as such is, contra Fichte, not subject-like, and finite subjecthood
emerges only in separation from it. “This Being must not be confused with identity.”21 When there is subject identity – when, as Hölderlin puts it (alluding to the
apperceptive unity of judgmental consciousness), “I say: I am I”22 – then “the I
is only possible by means of this separation of the I from the I.”23 That is to say,
finite subjecthood and apperceptively unified judgmental consciousness is essentially displayed in focusing conceptually structured attention on this or that
successively: for example, now on a cup, now on a chair. When I do thus focus
my conceptually structured attention, then my experience is mine and judgmentally structured, and I am aware of my judgments and representations as mine
over time, as I focus on this or that. But this means that in achieving and exercising judgmental awareness I am “opposing myself to myself, separating myself
from myself ” albeit while “recognizing myself as the same in the opposed.”24
Finite subject identity then requires separation and self-recognition across
different moments of conceptual awareness or judgment. And this in turn means
that subject identity is not simply given within Being or nature, but instead that it
‘stands out’ from Being through its own conceptual activity. But in this standing
out, immersion in Being proper is lost. “Identity is not a union of subject and
object which simply occurred, hence identity is not = absolute Being.”25 It is true
that “in the concept of separation [of the finite subject from absolute Being] there lies
already the concept of the reciprocity of object and subject and the necessary
presupposition of a whole [absolute Being] of which object and subject form the
parts.”26 But unity with absolute Being is lost through the arche-separation
through which finite subjecthood comes to be, and the nature of its emergence
cannot be traced back across this arche-separation by a finite subject, who
remains always within already emerged subject activity. As Hölderlin puts it in
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the original Preface to Hyperion, “the blessed unity, being, in the unique sense of the
word, is lost to us.”27 As Dieter Henrich comments, “Hölderlin defines being as the
undivided unity of what [subsequently] emerges from division in the form of subject
and object. Anyone could have seen that it would be circular to derive subject and
object from being, so conceived,”28 which is to say that there can be no theoretical
explanation of just how subjectivity emerges from absolute Being: all that can be
said is that it emerges via arche-separation from original unity. Any time we as
finite subjects undertake to look to see how subjectivity emerges we see only finite
empirical objects as they can be seen or otherwise sensed by finite subjects, not
absolute Being itself. (In his late hymns Hölderlin thematizes what has been called
the self-occlusion of God from us.)
As a result, then, absolute Being – including absolute Being as it presents itself
in nature (especially beautiful nature) and in other people (especially in intimate
friends and lovers) – remains for Hölderlin not an object of theoretical knowledge, but instead an object of love to be received and accepted and also an
object against and through which selfhood must be independently asserted. For
Hölderlin, according to Henrich, “as much as love and selfhood tend to be
mutually exclusive, they nonetheless belong together, and only then constitute a
life in its totality.…Yet it is not easy to bring them together in freedom, nor even
to conceive of the unity in virtue of which they belong together.”29 There is no
possibility of knowing absolute Being and one’s route of emergence from it, in
such a way that one could be guided by this knowledge securely toward the
achievement of both love and selfhood. To this extent, Hölderlin remains
opposed to dogmatism and closer to the spirit of Kant’s critical philosophy than
does Fichte, who in contrast continues to seek orienting explanations of the
emergence, nature, and destiny of finite subjectivity.30 In contrast to that of
Fichte, Hölderlin’s thought remains dominated by “the truth of skepticism,”31
the thought that absolute Being demands always that we both assert our independence from it and accept and love it: it cannot be simply known, in such a
way that our path is made secure. Unity with oneself as an independent being
and with nature and others as objects of love remains always to be achieved. For
Hölderlin, as Richard Velkley puts it, “subjectivity entails that disharmony and
conflict are intrinsic to the human situation; conflict in turn makes necessary the
human quest for resolution in unity.”32 Hence (in Henrich’s formulation) “in the
conflict of love and selfhood [the human subject] runs [its] course, either errantly or
with self-understanding.”33

V
“The path of life,” then, “does not lead back into the origin.”34 Instead, the best
that we can achieve, in life and in art, is
an ordered modulation of acts in which each of the tendencies of life
[especially love–fusion vs. selfhood–independence] is momentarily released
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.…Art, like the consummate life, will but repeat harmoniously the
processes of the actual, and deliver its oppositions from their conflict
through completeness and order.35
Hölderlin develops his famous Wechseltonlehre – his doctrine of the modulation
or exchange of poetic moods – precisely in order to characterize how order or
modulated succession may be achieved in a poem in repetition of “the processes
of the actual” in life. Order or modulated succession in poetry and in life then
stands in place of impossible master theoretical knowledge of the place of finite
subjecthood in relation to absolute being as process through which the composition and composure of the self may be achieved. As James H. Donelan usefully
characterizes this move,
self-positing through opposition to the material [as in Fichte’s effort to
know the ground of finite subjecthood in absolute Being/subject activity] has given
way in poetry and music to self-positing through opposition in the material [as the finite subject moves coherently through opposed moments of attention and
mood]. [In this way there is] a material existence for self-positing activity.36
Finite subjecthood maintains its existence in and through successive acts of
attention and interfused moods, and it maintains its existence well when these
acts and moods are ordered, modulated, in their succession of one another.
Donelan argues cogently that Hölderlin developed his Wechseltonlehre under the
inspiration of the theory of harmonic modulation in musical composition, as
expounded in Christian Gottfried Körner’s 1795 essay “Über
Charakterdarstellung in der Musik,” published in Schiller’s journal Die Horen.37
In the essay fragment “Wechsel der Töne” [“The Modulation of Tones”] Hölderlin
offers a specific theory of the proper developments or actions of epic poetry,
lyric poetry, and tragic poetry as they should move from their various beginnings
into opposites and finally into resolutions. The complexes of subject matter,
diction, and mood through which poems properly move are analogized to key
centers, and they are characterized by Hölderlin in terms such as “naïve, heroic,
idealistic, naïve–heroic, ideal–heroic,” etc.38
Of more interest, however, for Hölderlin’s understanding of the life of a
finite subject and of its possibilities of development is his longer essay “On the
Operations of the Poetic Spirit” [“Verfahrungsweise des poetischen Geistes”]
(1800?).39 In this essay, Hölderlin develops his theory of modulation specifically
as an account of the processes of the actual through which finite subjecthood
exists and through which its composure may be achieved, when modulation is
smooth and natural.
The essay begins with a series of reminders of things of which the poet must
be aware. Chief among these is the thought that “a conflict is necessary between
[1] the most original postulate of the spirit which aims at [the] communality and
unified simultaneity of all parts, and [2] the other postulate which commands
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the spirit to move beyond itself and reproduce itself ” (62) as apperceptively
unified, independent selfhood, sustaining itself across opposed acts of attention.
This conflict can in turn be understood as resulting from the demands that the
work have both spiritual content or a presentation of “the interrelation of all
parts” of nature and spiritual form or an “alternation of parts” as they are variously attended to by a finite subject (62). This conflict can be partially, but only
partially, resolved in that across successive acts of attention “harmonious alternation” can “replace as much as was lost of the original relation and unity of the
parts” (63) in absolute being, from which finite subjecthood has emerged. Such
harmonious alternations can “satisfy the demands of the spirit” (63) to some
degree, even though the opposition of “spiritual tranquil content” (the wholeness
of nature) and “spiritual alternating form” (a finite subject with its specific acts of
successive attention) remains “irreconcilable” (64). “Material identical striving”
(or a self-identical, specific finite subjectivity) and “material alternation” (or the
actual scenes, events, or thoughts that successively occupy attention) are also
irreconcilable, but when there is harmonious alternation of subject matter,
mood, and tone, then each “renders tangible” (64) the other.
Any poem will be composed of either (a) sequences of events, perspectives,
and realities, (b) sequences of desires, representations, thoughts, and passions, or
(c) sequences of fictions and possibilities, and in each case the sequence can be
treated either objectively (as a matter of things that happen independently of
any subject’s attention) or subjectively (as sequences of a subject’s acts of attention) (64). The harmonious development of a sequence requires, however, that it
have an “authentic cause” (64) which serves as the “foundation of the poem”
(65) in forming or controlling “transition between the expression, that which is
presented, the sensuous subject matter, that which is actually pronounced in the
poem, and…the spirit, the idealistic treatment” (65) or the moods, attitudes,
thoughts, and feelings of the self responding to the sensuous subject matter.
“Between the expression (the presentation) and the free idealistic treatment,
there lies the foundation and significance of the poem” (66). A successful poem,
that is to say, presents sensuous subject matter (sequences of events, thoughts, or
possibilities) as infused with appropriately responsive thoughts, feelings, moods,
and attitudes on the part of a responding, composing subject, and vice versa.
When an authentic cause or foundation controls the transitions within a poem,
then “does the poet provide the idealistic [the finite, striving, self-opposed, self-identical
human subject] with a beginning, a direction, a significance” (10). The poet’s
modulated attention, thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and moods model or show,
that is to say, how any human subject might appropriately respond to this
sensuous subject matter. “At this point the spirit, which appeared as finite by
virtue of the [subject/object] opposition [and the opposition of itself to itself in successive
acts of attention], is tangible in its infinity” (69). Through modulated transitions the
poet as finite human subject can feel himself to be – although independent and
apart from absolute Being as such – also harmoniously related to it, to share an
underlying life with things. Through identification with and even participation in
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the poet’s subjectivity (especially in lyric), readers too can balance a felt sense of
independent selfhood with a sense of belonging to a whole in love.
But this felt sense of independence and connection remains aesthetic and not
an object of theoretical knowledge. The poetic self cannot “become its own
object” (71). Were it to undertake to do so – to reflect directly on itself rather than
via attention to sensuous subject matter – then it would find only “a dead and
deadly unity,” “an infinite stagnation,” a vengeful, world-denying, empty ego.
Nor does this felt sense of independence and belonging altogether resolve
contradictions that attach inherently to the life of any finite subject. The poetic
and human subject remains always entangled in a triangular relation among the
sensuous subject matter cognized or attended to, the actual content of the cognition (the subject’s thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and moods), and the self-opposing,
self-identical I that is doing the cognizing (71). The subject
has to remain inevitably in contradiction with himself, within the necessary conflict (1) of the striving for pure selfhood and identity, (2) of the
striving for significance [Bedeutenheit] and differentiation, (3) of the
striving for harmony.…
(74)
Nonetheless, if the human subject is neither “too selfless, that is, devoted
to…object[s] in a too self-forgetful manner,…nor too selfish, that is, hovering
between its inner foundation and its object in a too undecided, empty, and indetermined manner” (78), then it can manage – to an extent, and for a time, within
certain scenes and moments of relationship – to be more or less ‘at home’ with
itself, with empirical objects, and with other human subjects, all somehow within
a whole whose essence we cannot know.

VI
In the Preface to Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein comments on the structure
of his writing. He felt, he tells us, compelled “to travel over a wide field of thought
criss-cross in every direction” and compelled not by mere idiosyncrasy or personal
compulsion but by “the very nature of the investigation” (p. ix). There is no single
originating insight or intellectual intuition in virtue of which the place of the
finite subject in the world can be conclusively established. Instead there are
sequences of thoughts about subjectivity and conceptual consciousness, themselves prompted by phenomena of human life and language as, one might say,
their ‘authentic causes.’ The criss-cross travel through thoughts about the human
– a progress, not an exposition of a theory – remains controlled, however, by the
“natural inclination” of “my thoughts” (p. ixe). Despite their lack of control by
any guiding insight that governs their place in a systematic exposition, these
thoughts are here portrayed by Wittgenstein as falling into chains of natural inclination, transition, or modulation one into another.
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Everywhere the course of thoughts remains surrounded by awareness of the
materiality of human being in the world, an awareness announced first in §1 in
the thought that the shopkeeper “acts” with words, as he identifies and
distributes apples, and then deepened in §2, as we are introduced to the builder
and his assistant who call for and pass blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams. It is
pronounced that there is, to adapt Donelan’s phrase, here “a material existence
for self-positing activity,” for subjects doing things with words in the form of
calls and responses.
Despite the emphasis on the material existence of human subjects with one
another in their doings, it is also repeatedly emphasized that we are unlike other
animals: sapient, not merely sentient.40 Other animals “simply do not talk”
(§25). It is undeniable, primitive, that we have a life of thought with other
human subjects:
What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can feel?
Is it that my education has led me to it by drawing my attention to feelings in myself, and now I transfer the idea to objects outside myself ?
That I can recognize that there is something there (in me) which I can
call “pain” without getting into conflict with the way other people use
this word? – I do not transfer my idea to stones, plants, etc.
(§283)
We see the life of other subjects as subjects immediately in their bearing
and action.
The human body is the best picture of the human soul.
(p. 178e)
My attitude toward him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the
opinion that he has a soul.
(p. 178e)
“I believe that he is not an automaton”, just like that, so far makes no
sense.
(p. 178e)
It is for us unavoidable, immediate, that we share with other subjects a life as
self-conscious subjects, able to talk, to follow rules, and to think. This life of
subjects with one another happens in and through material practices; we should
not be ‘taken in’ by a picture of human conceptual consciousness according to
which “the world is dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is
light” (p. 184e). Coming to thought and finite subjectivity is more a matter of
halting emergence in and through material practice with others than that picture
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suggests. Within material practice with others, we are present to ourselves and to
one another as subjects.
Yet this presence is also mysterious to us. We want to know, theoretically, how
and why we are minded as we are as finite subjects. It feels to us as though we
were, somehow, cast out into finite subjectivity from original immersion in
nature, and we want to know how this is so. We ask ourselves questions such as,
“What makes this utterance into an utterance about him [a person whom I see vividly
before me]?” (p. 177e). Where does my–our thought, my–our conceptually structured awareness come from? Is it a matter of my having images or dispositions in
mind or mechanisms at work within me? No; these routes of explanation are one
and all nonsense. What accompanies images or dispositions or what comes about
via a mechanism fails to ‘match up’ with how criteria of correctness control the
application of a word. Yet we continue to want an explanation.
We should like to hypostatize feelings where there are none. They serve
to explain our thoughts to us.
‘Here explanation of our thinking demands a feeling!’ It is as if our
conviction were simply consequent upon this requirement.
(§598)
In the grip of this desire for an explanation, we do “predicate of the thing
what lies in the method of representing it. Impressed by the possibility of a
comparison, we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality” (§104). Yet we remain present to ourselves and to one another as subjects
only within ordinary material practices of language use and thought rather than
constituted as self-sufficient observer–conceptualizers apart from them. Always
“the deep aspect of this matter readily eludes us” (§387).
Instead, then, of discovering once and for all who or what we are as thinking,
concept-mongering subjects apart from material practices, the only thing we can
do is live out our conflicting tendencies within ordinary, material, linguisticconceptual practice, as we variously assert our selfhood in partial independence
of it (we can invent new terms, modify conceptual schemes, and take to myth
and metaphor) and accept, acknowledge, and even love the ordinary as the only
possible vehicle of the life of a finite subject.
We can set up “objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts
of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities”
(§130). For example, “a cry is not a description. But there are transitions
[Übergänge]. And the words ‘I am afraid’ may approximate more, or less, to being
a cry. They may come quite close to this and also be far removed from it”
(p. 189e). In seeking to find “my way about” (§123), “finding and inventing intermediate cases” (§122) that modulate into one another will be important, always,
rather than ‘determining’ the nature of our being in the world once and for all,
as somehow a function of either ‘soul substance’ or ‘bodily substance’ (the brain)
224

The Literary Wittgenstein, edited by John Gibson, and Wolfgang Huemer, Taylor & Francis Group, 2004. ProQuest Ebook
Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/swarthmore/detail.action?docID=182426.
Created from swarthmore on 2021-11-29 22:39:18.

RO TAT I N G T H E A X I S O F O U R I N V E S T I G AT I O N

that we can observe theoretically from without, so as to track the emergence of
subjectivity.
What is one to make of this ‘philosophy’ of the human subject, a philosophy
that – like Hölderlin’s ‘philosophy,’ poetology, and poetry – insists everywhere on
the impossibility of theoretical explanation of subjectivity and on the importance of transitions, modulations, of thought, attention, attitude, mood, and
feeling, with other beings, as crucial to the life of any finite subject? Answers that
we give to this question will depend on what we hope for from philosophy –
‘anthropologico–poetic’ ‘elucidation’ or theoretical explanation. If we cannot
quite give up wishes for theory and for absolute mastery of and within our practices, it is, perhaps, nonetheless the course of wisdom to recognize these wishes
as wishes, within the texture of our ongoing lives as finite subjects with others
within nature, and then to try to live with these wishes gracefully, within genuine
modulations between selfhood–independence and love–attunement. Or so, at
any rate, both Hölderlin and Wittgenstein undertake to teach themselves, and us,
in and through their exploratory writing about the human.
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